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Introduction 
Beijing’s cautious approach to defusing recent international tension over North Korea’s ballistic 
missile launches underscores the dilemmas it addresses in its difficult relationship with 
Pyongyang on the one hand and its interests with respect to the United States on the other. The 
missile launches were conducted in the midst of China’s renewed diplomacy to revive the stalled 
Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs. Beijing is now likely to redouble efforts to 
revive the talks as the most effective mechanism to resolve the issues of both Pyongyang’s 
nuclear and missile programs. 
Beijing’s initial public response to U.S. official warnings and ROK and Western media reports that 
Pyongyang on July 4-5 had conducted a series of missile launches, including an unsuccessful 
test launch of a long-range Taepongdong-2, was low-key and seems intended to encourage 
Washington and other capitals previously engaged in the Six-Party Talks not to overplay their 
responses. The official Xinhua News Agency cited foreign media sources in reporting the North 
Korean launches July without comment. On the 5th, the Foreign Ministry acknowledged that 
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing had “exchanged views” with counterparts in Washington, Tokyo, 
Seoul, and Canberra. Also on the 5th, Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao expressed 
Beijing’s “serious concern” about the situation and urged all sides to remain “coolheaded and 
restrained” in their reactions and to avoid steps that will “make the situation more tense and 
complicated.” Liu added that Beijing in the past had made “unremitting efforts” to promote the Six-
Party Talks and pledged to continue to “play a constructive role” in this regard. 
Before the North Korean missile launches, Beijing’s public posture in response to apparent 
preparations to test a Taepodong-2 long-range missile had sought both to discourage Pyongyang 
from escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula by proceeding with its test launch and to 
encourage restraint on the part of Washington and other capitals in the region. Beijing’s initial 
reaction to U.S. official statements and foreign media reports that Pyongyang was preparing a 
test launch of the Taepodong-2 came on June 20, when a Foreign Ministry spokesman denied 
“complete understanding” of the situation and urged all sides to work together to preserve “peace 
and stability” on the peninsula.  
Two days later, the Foreign Ministry spokesman Jiang Yu stated that Beijing was “very 
concerned” about the possible North Korean test, noted that Beijing was maintaining “close 
contacts and communication with all parties” to the Six-Party Talks, and urged all sides to 
“proceed from the overall situation, overcome current obstacles, adopt a more flexible attitude, 
and make more efforts to improve mutual trust.” In New York, PRC United Nations representative 
Wang Guangya stated on the 22nd that Beijing “does not want to see” a North Korean test launch. 
On the 27th, the Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed the need to “try to defuse the 
confrontational atmosphere.” Finally, on the 28th, Xinhua’s Hong Kong subsidiary Zhongguo 
Tongxunshe cited Premier Wen Jiabao—in Beijing’s most authoritative statement to date—urging 
in a press conference in Shenzhen “all parties” to “proceed from the overall situation on the 
Korean peninsula, continue to exercise restraint, and avoid a deterioration of the situation.” 
Six-Party Talks 
The North Korean missile launches and the international tensions that preparations for them 
provoked came in the midst of a new, concerted effort by Beijing to get the Six-Party Talks on 
North Korea’s nuclear programs—stalled since November 2005—back on track. Since May, 
Beijing engaged in a new round of quiet diplomacy to revive the talks, including talks with 
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso, ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, and Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov on May 23 and with Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. delegate to the 
talks Christopher Hill on May 24. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, and 
Premier Wen Jiaobao then received the DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun in Beijing in late 
May and early June. On June 1, China’s top party and state leader Hu Jintao personally called 
President Bush to urge U.S. acceptance of a North Korean invitation to send Assistant Secretary 
Hill to Pyongyang for talks preceding a new session of the Six-Party Talks. Finally, on June 28, 
Xinhua and South Korean news service Yonhap reported that Li Zhaoxing and Ban Ki-moon had 
put together a new joint proposal to present to Pyongyang and Washington to break the impasse 
in the Six-Party Talks. 
The Six-Party Talks had held five sessions in Beijing between August 2003 and November 2005. 
Their fourth session, in September 2005, had produced a six-article joint declaration in which 
Pyongyang pledged to abandon its nuclear programs and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), while retaining the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On its part, 
Washington agreed to renew efforts to assistance the DPRK’s acquisition of light-water reactors 
(promised in the 1994 ‘agreed framework'), practice non-aggression toward North Korea, and 
work to normalize relations with Pyongyang. The fifth session of talks broke down in November 
2005 over disagreement between Pyongyang and Washington about the sequence of North 
Korea’s dismantlement of its nuclear programs and U.S. discussions about assistance with 
peaceful nuclear energy. 
While only implicit in Beijing’s authoritative comment on North Korean preparations to resume 
missile tests, which had been unilaterally suspended in 1999 after the Clinton Administration 
agreed to talks on North Korean missile programs, lower level Chinese commentary made it plain 
that Beijing was irritated at Pyongyang and saw renewed missile firings as a serious obstacle to 
the Six-Party Talks.  
For example: 
• On June 21, the Shanghai party newspaper Wen Hui Bao carried a commentary that 
stated that “it is not good to play with fire, and pouring oil on a fire is an act that should 
not be adopted. If a gun goes off accidentally, peace and stability in northeast Asia is 
bound to be threatened, and other countries in the region will also be involved.”  
• Also on the 21st, the Canton newspaper Guangzhou Ribao carried a commentary by 
China Institute of International Studies analyst Zhao Qinghai, who predicted that a North 
Korean missile test would “create new factors of uncertainty in northeast Asia... Should 
the DPRK carry out the test, it will cause an anti-DPRK wave among the public in Japan, 
the United States, and elsewhere, and it is possible that U.S. and Japanese policy toward 
the DPRK will harden. Demonized and pushed by the United States and Japan, the 
DPRK may become even more isolated internationally, DPRK-ROK relations will be hurt, 
the process of improving DPRK-Japanese relations may be interrupted, and the DPRK 
tactic of engaging four (China, Russia, Japan, and the ROK) to attack one (the United 
States) at the Six-Party Talks will be still more difficult to carry out.”  
• On the 24th, the PRC-owned communist Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po carried a 
commentary by Phoenix television commentator Qiu Zhenhai suggested that 
Pyongyang’s resumption of missile testing would “not only complicate the regional 
security situation, but also put China and Russia in a more difficult situation and 
encourage hard-line forces in the United States and Japan.”  
Low-level Chinese commentary also made plain the hopes Beijing’s official statements conveyed 
implicitly that Washington would respond calmly to the North Korean missile test preparations and 
firings. On June 21, the Shanghai newspaper Dongfang Zaobao carried a commentary by Fudan 
University’s Institute of International Studies Vice President Shen Dingli, a politically well-
connected academic well known to American counterparts, that urged both Pyongyang and 
Washington as “stakeholders” to avoid steps that exacerbate the situation. The United States, in 
particular, Shen observed, “as a big and powerful country should be better able to keep its cool 
and keep the situation under control, rather than be driven by the situation.” 
The Logic of Beijing’s Approach 
The logic of Beijing’s cautionary response to the North Korean missile launches builds on the 
same array of interests that drives the overall policy approach to the Korean peninsula that it has 
pursued since the end of the Cold War. The weight of these interests, which include serious 
considerations for PRC security and economic prosperity, make Beijing a decidedly status quo 
player in the international politics of the Korean peninsula. 
From a security perspective, Beijing since the founding of the PRC in 1949 has regarded North 
Korea as a security buffer against an American-backed South Korea and, by extension, American 
and potentially Japanese power. It was for this reason in part that Beijing intervened in the 
Korean War once American-commanded UN forces crossed the 38th parallel into the North and 
advanced to the Yalu River.  
Although circumstances have changed dramatically with respect to the interests of all of the major 
external powers on the peninsula—none of the four (China, Japan, the USA, and Russia) sees an 
interest in renewed hostilities—Beijing retains a basic interest in a viable North Korean regime. 
For this reason, while Beijing nominally backs Pyongyang’s calls for unification, it is not eager to 
see the division of Korea change, whether by negotiated unification or state collapse in the North, 
without clearly predictable consequences that do not jeopardize Chinese security. While Beijing’s 
1961 security treaty with Pyongyang is still on the books, it is effectively a dead letter. And while 
Beijing does not favor a unification of Korea under ROK auspices if it presents the prospects of 
American forces deployed under the 1953 U.S.-ROK security pact in the North, it also tacitly 
accepts the presence of American forces in the South today as a deterrent to renewed hostilities 
on the peninsula. 
Economically, China has developed extensive relationships with all of the major northeast Asian 
powers that are critical to its ongoing economic development and prosperity. South Korea in 2005 
was the PRC’s fourth-ranking trade partner, accounting for a $112 billion total volume, and its 
fourth-ranking source of direct foreign investment. The United States and Japan were China’s 
first- and second-ranking trade partners, respectively. In real terms, the engine of much of 
China’s impressive economic growth in recent years has been the markets and investments of 
three of its five partners engaged in the Six-Party Talks, and instability and renewed hostilities on 
the Korean peninsula can easily disturb these critical relationships. 
Politically, little of substance remains of the ideological solidarity between Beijing and Pyongyang 
that dominated their relations in the 1950s, when both states shared similar international contexts 
as excluded pariahs from the American-dominated international system. Particularly after 
Beijing’s strategic rapprochement with Washington in the 1968-1972 watershed in geopolitics, 
Beijing’s and Pyongyang’s interests increasingly diverged. With the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s 
market-based reforms after 1978 and Beijing’s increasingly explicit interest-driven foreign policy, 
little remained of the once prominent “sealed in blood” political relationship of the earlier era. 
While Beijing and Pyongyang still salute each other with ideologically-laced toasts on ceremonial 
occasions, low-level Chinese media occasionally conveyed Beijing’s distaste for Pyongyang’s 
“dynastic” leadership succession from DPRK founder Kim Il-song to his son, the “dear leader” 
Kim Jong-il and from time to time register Beijing’s irritation that Pyongyang does not adopt some 
form of economic reform to improve its fortunes. 
Given these fundamental interests, “peace and stability” has long been the watchword in Beijing’s 
stance on Korean issues, priorities that figure as the baseline in Beijing’s recent official 
statements on North Korea’s missile tests. In service of these priorities, Beijing has pressed three 
tactics consistently on North Korean issues. First, it has for more than two decades pressed 
Pyongyang to initiate economic reform, including opening to the international economy, to 
strengthen itself and improve its viability. These efforts to persuade Pyongyang of the advisability 
of Chinese-style reforms began in the early 1980s and were visible most recently during Kim 
Jong-il’s tour in January this year of south China, including two of China’s four original special 
economic zones, which had served as the spearhead of China’s entry into the international 
economy in 1979. 
Second, Beijing has pressed Pyongyang to expand its international relationships to break out of 
its diplomatic isolation and to negotiate seriously with Seoul, Tokyo, and especially Washington, 
and it has shown clear irritation with Pyongyang for actions that impede this progress. And third, 
Beijing has counseled the other major players on the Korean peninsula on the need for patience 
and flexibility in dealings with Pyongyang as the best means to assuage what Beijing regards as 
Pyongyang’s real concerns about security—especially with respect to the United States. 
These tactics were evident in Beijing’s approach to dealing with the escalation in regional 
tensions over Pyongyang’s acknowledgement to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jim Kelly in 
October 2002 that it had a secret uranium enrichment program. Beijing confined its displeasure at 
Pyongyang to low-level commentary—usually in the communist-controlled Hong Kong press—
and urged flexibility on the part of Washington and later the other regional players in response. 
After taking the initial position that North Korean nuclear developments should be addressed in 
bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang, but thereafter worked persistently to bring 
about three-party (PRC-DPRK-U.S.) talks in Beijing in April 2003 and then the six-party process 
that began in August 2003. 
Prospects  
Given the basic PRC interests on the Korean peninsula sketched above, Beijing’s cautionary 
approach to the current North Korean provocation should not surprise. It is likely to stress that the 
resumption of missile launches by the North is best approached by enfolding the question into the 
six-party framework. For these reasons, it will also likely oppose actions by the UN Security 
Council and work hard to ensure that at least Russia is willing to join Beijing in vetoing UN 
sanctions so that Beijing does not stand alone on the issue. It will likely discourage but also tacitly 
acquiesce the bilateral steps to pressure Pyongyang, such as economic sanctions by Tokyo and 
comparable new steps by Washington, while believing that such steps are likely to harden 
Pyongyang’s readiness to return to the Six-Party Talks. Meanwhile, it is likely to counsel calm in 
response to Pyongyang’s provocations and intensify diplomatic efforts to get the six-party process 
back on track. 
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